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In March of 1968, United States Agency for International Development director William 
S. Gaud forged an enduring myth in the imaginary of Third World development.  Just a month 
after the Tet Offensive had threatened America’s narrative of military progress in South 
Vietnam, Gaud announced that the road to victory in Southeast Asia was paved not with guns or 
grenades, but rice seed.  Celebrating the efforts of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in 
reforming Indian, Filipino, and Vietnamese agriculture through the introduction of fertilizer, 
pesticides, and improved seed, Gaud coined a term that would long outlive him: 
Throughout much [of] the developing world - and particularly in Asia - we are on the 
verge of an agricultural revolution… It is not a violent Red Revolution like that of the 
Soviets, nor is it a White revolution like that of the Shah of Iran.  I call it the Green 
Revolution.
1
 
 
It was thus in the context of the Cold War at its hottest that Gaud’s Green Revolution was born, 
and its mythological career fared somewhat like that of the Vietnamese war that it was meant to 
support.   
Its early proponents saw the extension of American agricultural technology into the Third 
World as an altruistic crusade external to the politics of left and right, a way to end hunger in 
suffering societies, and most importantly, a path toward defusing Communist rhetoric that 
blamed such hunger and poverty on American capitalism.  The project commanded nearly global 
faith in the years after Gaud’s pronouncement, reaching its apex with Rockefeller plant 
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pathologist Norman Borlaug’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970.  However, just as the 
Vietnam War lost its ideological luster in the 1970s and beyond, the Green Revolution too came 
under bitter critique.  Environmentalists blamed American scientists and corporations for soaking 
the Third World in toxic chemicals, social critics argued that the high price of new technologies 
resulted in the eviction of millions of poor farmers, and other observers found hollow the rhetoric 
of a “war on hunger” because poverty and starvation in the Global South persisted or even 
increased in the face of rising crop yields.
2
 
Yet like its supporters, critics of the Green Revolution have tended to see that project as 
monolithic, unable to divorce its complex past or evolving future from the context wherein it was 
given its name: the Cold War of 1968.   While William Gaud’s Green Revolution may have been 
a coherent and decidedly geopolitical project designed to shock “traditional” rural societies into 
urbanization and industrialization, as Nick Cullather, John Perkins, and other scholars have 
convincingly argued, to read that coherence into the past or the future is highly problematic.
3
  
For those of us who seek to understand the origins and evolution of the Green Revolution before 
it was named as such, we find ourselves in an especially difficult situation, as our very choice of 
vocabulary renders us guilty of anachronism.  How can we realistically discuss a “Green 
Revolution” in 1940s and 1950s Mexico, Colombia, or India, or even twenty-first century Africa, 
when the project that name was meant to describe was so embedded in a particular Cold War 
context?  Rather than a mere question of semantics, this dilemma points to a crucial flaw in how 
scholars have conceived of the periodization and definition of the Green Revolution.  If we are to 
retain the term as a viable historical container outside of the context in which Gaud coined it, 
perhaps it makes more sense for us to discuss “Green Revolutions” in plural form, as a series of 
broad campaigns loosely defined by agricultural technology transfer.  However, rather than 
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simply a phenomenon of the Global South, we might find that that project has roots much closer 
to home. 
In hopes of exploring the multiple visions that made up the many Green Revolutions, I 
am writing my dissertation on two twentieth-century agricultural reform campaigns waged by the 
Rockefeller philanthropies.  One is rather expected—that of the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) in 
Mexico during the 1940s and 1950s—while the other, waged in the American South during the 
Progressive era and New Deal years by the General Education Board (GEB), has rarely been 
linked to the later Cold War campaigns.   Although, long before Rockefeller-funded agronomists 
fanned out into the countryside of the Global South, they cut their teeth in the American South, a 
region that long served as a domestic laboratory for development projects.  The RF’s global 
campaigns in education, public health, and particularly agriculture, each had roots in the early 
twentieth-century U.S. South, though scholars are only now beginning to consider the ways in 
which domestic underdevelopment shaped American programs of assistance abroad.
4
 
When RF administrators began planning their soon-to-be-famous Mexican agricultural 
project in 1941, field agents on both sides of the border again and again referred back to the 
lessons and history of the American South, and while often guilty of oversimplification, perhaps 
they were on to something: both regions were born of the extractive colonial economies so 
common to the Caribbean basin.  For much of their history, Mexico and the U.S. South relied 
upon forced labor regimes that were founded upon racial difference and reinforced by either 
legal—or debt-enforced slavery.  In 1900, the land tenure systems of each region mirrored each 
other in their asymmetry, with landless majorities bound to vast estates as tenants, croppers, or 
wage laborers.  To the Alabama cotton planter of the early twentieth century, the henequen 
plantations of the Yucatán or the sugarcane haciendas of Morelos would each seem familiar.  
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Nevertheless, if the protagonists of this dissertation commonly employed comparison in their 
thought and action, I do not plan to write a comparative history, but rather a transnational one.  
Following the work of Micol Seigel, I believe that historical comparisons which treat its subjects 
as discrete, bounded entities that can be observed on their own terms—as so many earlier 
comparative studies have—make no room for that which crossed in between, whether it was 
people, ideas, capital, or commodities.
5
  In this case, the histories of twentieth-century rural 
Mexico and the U.S. South were forged in a common crucible, rather than on separate planes. 
In May 2011, I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) for three weeks, generously 
supported by a Grant-in-Aid from the RAC.  As it was my first visit to the archive, my time in 
May was spent exploring the records of several Rockefeller-funded institutions in order to hash 
out a rough outline of the narrative that I will expand upon in the dissertation.  For the sake of 
chronological continuity, I began my digging around the turn of the twentieth century, in the 
personal papers of the Rockefeller family, Frederick Gates, Wallace Buttrick, and in the early 
records of the GEB.   
The story that emerged was fascinating.  In the spring of 1901, the first “Millionaire’s 
Special” chugged down the Atlantic coastline from New York into the U.S. South.  Given its 
name by skeptical southern newspapermen, the “Special” was a train excursion attended by the 
leading lights in northern philanthropy, chartered by the wealthy New York merchant Robert C. 
Ogden to inspire interest in the American South among a new generation of industrialist donors.  
As the train chugged southward and stopped for tours of major black and white educational 
institutions from the Hampton Institute in Virginia to the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, its 
occupants both marveled and recoiled at the world before their eyes.  One such traveler was the 
twenty-seven year old John D. Rockefeller, Jr., pampered son of the Standard Oil magnate.  
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What Junior witnessed—endless cotton fields, dilapidated schoolhouses, and sharecroppers both 
black and white—would guide his career in the years to come; he later recalled the trip to be 
“one of the outstanding events of my life.”6 
 Though historians have recently argued that the fin-de-siécle years brought a final 
reconciliation between northern and southern whites as they united in a commitment to white 
male supremacy and empire, the Progressive years also pushed North and South farther apart, as 
a new generation of rationalizing urban experts began to define and diagnose poverty.  When 
they looked south, reformers and philanthropists in the first decade of the century saw a society 
emaciated by cotton monoculture, starved of capital, credit, education, and good health, a 
tropical land that seemed more like the “banana republics” of Central America than the urban, 
industrial America they imagined.  It was precisely within this context that John D. Rockefeller, 
Sr., spurred by his son’s engagement with southern reformers both black and white, founded the 
GEB in 1903, endowed it with one million dollars, and granted Junior leadership of the 
institution.  While Junior provided the public face of the GEB, its intellectual engine lay in 
Frederick Gates, Senior’s long-time business manager and a former Baptist preacher.  Far more 
so than Junior, Gates believed the ills of the South lay in the region’s soil and its poor 
cultivation, as I am beginning to discover from his personal correspondence, contained in 
Rockefeller Senior’s letterbooks.  Before any progress could be made toward educational reform, 
Gates believed, the GEB must focus its efforts on transforming southern agriculture. 
After months of searching for a blueprint for agricultural modernization, the GEB 
partnered with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and its agent Seaman A. Knapp.  
Knapp is a key transitional figure in U.S. agriculture, uncomfortably straddling the divide 
between nineteenth century yeoman agrarianism and the emerging government-industrial-
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research trinity of the twentieth.  Before his work with the GEB, Knapp had been the president of 
Iowa State Agricultural College, a land speculator in Louisiana, and a USDA bio-prospector in 
Asia and the Caribbean, where he had sought improved varieties of rice to transplant within the 
American South.  Throughout his career, Knapp had championed farm demonstrations as the 
most efficient way to teach scientific methods to American farmers, whom he saw as inherently 
resistant to change.  Yet unlike professors in the emerging land-grant college complex, whom he 
had little regard for, Knapp believed that farmers would never listen to outsiders, no matter what 
their academic credentials.  However, if a trusted neighbor could demonstrate physical results 
and distill scientific method into familiar vocabulary, Knapp believed that farmers would be 
eager to adopt more productive practices.
7
 
In 1903, when the federal government haltingly began moving to prevent the spread of 
the cotton boll weevil as it cut a broad swath from Mexico toward Texas and into the southeast, 
Knapp, at the ripe age of 70, proclaimed that he had discovered a solution to the biological crisis 
which seemed to threaten American cotton culture.  On a demonstration farm in Terrell, Texas, 
Knapp boasted of having beaten the weevil through early planting, regular cultivation, and 
burning cotton stalks post-harvest, and soon found himself as the head of the USDA’s effort to 
control the weevil’s spread.  However, in an era when the USDA and the federal government 
were only shadows of the juggernauts they would later become, Knapp’s affiliation with 
Washington brought him little backing to wage a vast campaign.  Interstate commerce laws 
restricted the government’s intervention only to states currently infested with the weevil, which 
meant that any reform east of the Mississippi River would have to wait.  It was at this moment 
that Gates and the GEB initiated contact with Knapp, pledging their aid in states that had not yet 
received USDA funding.  Beginning in 1906, GEB money sent Knapp’s agents into Mississippi, 
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then to Alabama, Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia in the year that followed, hiring and 
teaching local farmers to serve as demonstrators of the “Knapp method.” 
In reconsidering the Knapp-GEB agricultural campaign as a forerunner to later Green 
Revolutions, I am asking the same questions of it that social scientists have asked of 
contemporary development projects in the Global South.
8
  How did reformers invent a definition 
of “poverty” that fit with their goals for target societies?  Did outside “experts” disguise the 
political intentions of their reform work in a neutral language of scientific efficiency?  How 
responsive were these outsiders to local particularities and knowledge?  Ultimately, I found the 
GEB’s agricultural work to be profoundly incoherent and torn by competing visions.  One 
element of the campaign sought to raise more cotton in the face of weevil infestations, with little 
regard to soil fertility or economic justice.
9
  On the other hand, Knapp’s GEB-funded agents also 
confronted structural and environmental issues, as embodied in their “Ten Commandments.”  
Among the Knapp Commandments were suggestions toward a more sustainable agriculture: 
planting “a winter cover crop,” “the judicious use of barnyard manure and legumes,” and the 
“systematic rotation of crops,” along with an emphasis on “home production of food required for 
the family and for the stock.”10 
  Unfortunately, the RAC’s records of the GEB agricultural work are incomplete.  Missing 
is the bulk of correspondence between Knapp, GEB officers such as Gates and Buttrick, and the 
USDA’s Bureau of Plant Industry, which directed the administration of the rural farm agents.  
Because of the dearth of documents explaining the complex relationship between these three 
groups, many questions remain.  Perhaps most importantly, how much power did the GEB have 
in shaping the demonstration program?  Contemporary accounts wrote of the group as a “silent 
partner” contributing little more than money, but I imagine that much of the reluctance to boast 
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of Rockefeller influence was due to public distrust of the family.  It seems instead that the GEB 
had considerable capacity to push Knapp and the USDA in unplanned directions, one of which 
regarded African-American farmers: because of the GEB’s insistence on a biracial program and 
its alliance with Tuskegee Institute, the USDA did hire dozens of black agents to spread the 
gospel of diversification to African-American communities.
11
  Of particular importance, because 
of its later Mexican legacy, did the GEB officers see their work as an opportunity to end rural 
poverty, or to simply raise cotton yields?  This fall, when I investigate Knapp’s personal papers 
in Lubbock, Texas, and Lake Charles, Louisiana, along with the USDA records in College Park, 
Maryland, I hope to find answers to these questions.  While earlier historians dismissed Knapp 
and the GEB as myopic technocrats, I am interested to see whether they displayed more elasticity 
and adaptation than has been previously credited to them.
12
 
 However coherent or incoherent the goals of the farm demonstration program may have 
been, its enduring accomplishments lay not in diversification or the elimination of southern 
poverty.  In May of 1914, the Smith-Lever Act created within the USDA the Cooperative 
Extension Service, essentially nationalizing the Knapp/GEB project and expanding its work into 
every state in the U.S.  Over the course of the twentieth century, the Extension Service 
aggressively championed efficiency, mechanization, and an industrial ethos for farming that 
ultimately reaped similar demographic effects in the American countryside as later Green 
Revolutions would in the Third World.
13
  However, in the American South, it would be many 
years before the federal government transformed agricultural practices.  If the weevil or Knapp’s 
agents had any success in dethroning King Cotton, the global surge in the price of the fiber 
during the Great War quickly eroded any gains of the diversification campaign. 
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 Yet, if Smith-Lever canonized the life and work of Seaman Knapp, for the GEB it had a 
rather contrary impact.  As the bill was being debated before Congress, the Rockefeller family 
found itself at the center of a firestorm of controversy, after labor unrest at the family-owned 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company resulted in the deaths of nineteen people in Ludlow, Colorado.  
Public outrage toward the family spilled over into the Smith-Lever hearings, and after it was 
widely publicized that the Rockefeller-funded GEB had both influenced and financed the 
demonstration work, the group was barred from any future cooperation with USDA programs. 
Despite this setback, in no way did the Smith-Lever uproar bring an end to the 
Rockefeller philanthropies’ involvement within the U.S. South, which only increased in the years 
to come, though in public health work rather than agriculture.  In 1909, JDR Senior founded the 
Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease.  After moderate 
success in controlling this parasite in the U.S. South, the Sanitary Commission began work on 
malaria, yellow fever, and tuberculosis, and when the Rockefeller Foundation was chartered in 
1913, that institution was explicitly designed with the intention of internationalizing the family’s 
earlier work within the South.  Just as they would later do in the field of agriculture, the RF’s 
international public health campaigns in the 1910s and beyond, would employ the U.S. South as 
a laboratory for the Global South.  If a parasite or insect could be diagnosed and controlled in 
Mississippi or Arkansas, it was assumed that those results could also be replicated in Nicaragua 
or the Philippines.
14
 
 It was the hookworm and yellow fever campaigns that first brought the RF to Mexico in 
1920, as the most violent period of the Mexican Revolution was coming to an end and the long, 
divisive years of reconstruction were beginning.  Despite the rampant anti-Americanism of the 
Revolutionary era, modernizing, nation-building elites like Álvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías 
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Calles tolerated and even smiled upon the public health projects of the Rockefeller 
philanthropies, hoping that the RF campaigns might bolster their political legitimacy.
15
  Yet if 
the GEB had been able to conduct a politically neutral agricultural campaign in the U.S. South—
at least in terms of their rhetoric, if not action—such a feat would be impossible in 1920s 
Mexico, as every element of both agricultural science and agrarian politics had been sharpened 
and polarized by the Revolution.  Land reform had been enshrined in Mexico’s 1917 
Constitution, and while Obregón and Calles did little to advance this popular cause during the 
1920s and early 1930s, it had become political suicide to speak out against it.  To RF agents in 
Mexico, who acknowledged popular resentment against U.S. dabbling in agrarian matters, it 
made a lot of sense to stay away from any sort of agricultural campaign, despite their nagging 
insistence to such a program’s necessity throughout the 1930s.16 
 The impetus behind the RF’s involvement in Mexican agriculture came from two 
unlikely figures, both North Carolinians and both linked to Rockefeller philanthropy in the 
South:  Josephus Daniels and John A. Ferrell.  Daniels was the U.S. ambassador to Mexico from 
1933 to 1941; Ferrell was a physician, former hookworm agent, and top administrator in the 
RF’s International Health Division from the mid-1920s to the early 1940s.  Before his diplomatic 
appointment, Daniels had edited North Carolina’s largest newspaper the Raleigh News and 
Observer since the 1890s, and as a spokesman for white rural North Carolinians in the 
Progressive era, Daniels was at first a critic and then an ardent supporter of the GEB and 
Rockefeller public health campaigns.  When Daniels arrived to Mexico City in 1933 as 
ambassador, he immediately sympathized with the agrarian politics of the Revolution, 
interpreting the Mexican state’s renewed commitment to land reform in the 1930s as a kindred 
project to New Deal land reform in the American South.
17
  What Daniels saw as missing in 
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Mexico, however, was a concerted effort to extend scientific knowledge to common farmers.  In 
March of 1935, Ambassador Daniels wrote his old friend and soon-to-be RF president Raymond 
Fosdick to ask for a “larger cooperative program in Mexico” along the lines of the GEB: 
As you know, I have been greatly interested in these matters and was in at the beginning 
of the work in the South… [Mexico’s] problems are somewhat similar to those we had in 
the South for several decades following the Civil War…but some adaptation of the 
programs administered in the South by [Wallace] Buttrick, [Wickiffe] Rose, and others 
will, however, I think, make for real progress in Mexico...
18
 
 
Daniels’ conviction that Mexico needed a Knapp-style program deepened after a number of 
conversations with Ferrell, who visited Mexico several times throughout the 1930s on public 
health business, staying each time as a guest of the Ambassador in Mexico City.   
Like Daniels, Ferrell believed that the American South provided a model for how poor 
rural societies might work toward a more sustainable agriculture and egalitarian social structure, 
and began to press the RF leadership for investigating the possibilities of such a program.  In late 
1936, Ferrell sent copies of the GEB’s 1914 report on agriculture, along with pamphlets by 
North Carolina demonstration agent Jane McKimmon, to President Fosdick and other RF 
administrators, claiming that both “might have suggestive value to persons planning for 
Mexico’s economic development.”  Providing technical assistance to farmers who were just then 
beginning to receive their own land, argued Ferrell, “is one of the most urgent needs of 
Mexico.”19 
Yet despite Daniels’ and Ferrell’s continued requests, the RF moved slowly in organizing 
a rural demonstration program during the late 1930s.  Their reluctance was likely due to the 
continued radicalization of Mexican agrarian politics and increased anti-Americanism under 
leftist president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940).  It would take two major shifts to bring the RF 
into Mexican agriculture: the looming World War and a political transition in Mexico.  By 1940, 
  
   
12 
 
President Roosevelt was anticipating U.S. involvement in the World War, and wanted to shore 
up Latin American loyalty in the coming conflict.  That same year, Cárdenas surprised the 
Mexican political establishment by selecting the moderate Manuel Avila Camacho as his 
successor, who questioned Cárdenas’ agrarian program of redistribution and spoke out in favor 
of the embattled Catholic Church.  Both the Mexican right and left challenged Avila Camacho’s 
bid for office and U.S. observers fearfully predicted renewed violent revolution in Mexico.
20
  In 
hopes of preventing such a disaster, Roosevelt sent his newly elected vice president Henry A. 
Wallace to appear alongside Avila Camacho at his Mexico City inauguration in December of 
1940. 
In Green Revolution mythology, it was Wallace’s trip to Mexico that provided the spark 
for the RF’s Mexican Agricultural Program.21  Wallace, whose background as an Iowa corn 
breeder had inspired a lifelong interest and passion for all things Mexican, toured the countryside 
in the following weeks with his host, Ambassador Daniels.   As they met with peasant farmers 
and inspected fields of maize, Wallace came to believe that low corn yields were the root cause 
of the nation’s rural poverty.  As a firm believer in Cárdenas’s land reform program—the 
subdividing of privately held land into communally worked, inalienable public plots called ejidos 
—Wallace believed that improved varieties of corn could both feed a growing Mexico and 
bolster the ejido program to ensure rural peace.  If Daniels had had little success in his earlier 
attempts to invite the RF into Mexican agriculture, in Wallace he gained an enthusiastic and 
well-placed ally, who would exploit his political connections to begin negotiations with the RF  
leadership.  In February of 1941, the RF finally sent a team to Mexico to survey rural life and 
agriculture as a first step in initiating what became the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP). 
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Except what sort of a program would the RF pursue in Mexico?  During my three weeks 
of research in May, I only had time to dig briefly into the early years of the program’s 
establishment and administration.  Just from the 1941 and 1942 records alone, that I have 
investigated, it is clear that a number of competing visions fractured the early years of the MAP.  
For Josephus Daniels and John Ferrell, who served as crucial arbiters between the RF and the 
Mexican government in the early months of negotiation, the MAP ought to prioritize 
demonstration and extension over research, which they saw as the enduring legacy of the Knapp 
program in the U.S. South.  To project planner Albert Mann, who was simultaneously leading a 
renewed GEB effort in stabilizing U.S. southern agriculture, as the region hemorrhaged farm 
population during the New Deal, the MAP must remain conscious of the social and demographic 
impacts of technological change,
22
 but not all of the scientific team shared such views.   
For George Harrar, the MAP’s first director, immediate results to prove the efficacy of 
his controversial program outweighed long-term ruminations over the future of Mexican 
agriculture.  To Marte Gómez, a career agronomist and the recently-appointed director of the 
Mexican department of agriculture, the greatest potential of the MAP lay not for the peasantry, 
but in the professionalization and legitimization of Mexican agronomy and its practitioners.
23
  
Lastly, for Avila Camacho and his increasingly conservative ruling party, any sort of rural 
development that the state would support had to focus on urbanization and industrial 
development.  Rather than seeking to create a “plump and contented peasantry,” the Mexican 
state believed that if the campesino were to be modernized, it would have to occur in the city, not 
the country.
24
 
 As these discordant voices sought to shape the MAP, no crop better symbolized the 
tension between peasant security and industrial development than maize.   Few could deny the 
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centrality of the plant to the nation’s diet or agriculture at midcentury: cultivated on more acres 
than all other crops combined, corn also provided the vast majority of calories consumed by both 
rural and urban dwellers.
25
  Nevertheless, the revolutionary political elite, despite their rhetorical 
exaltation of pre-Columbian civilization, regarded corn with skepticism from both a cultural and 
agricultural standpoint.  Modernizing leaders viewed Indian corn as a poor source of nutrition 
that produced backwards people, especially in contrast to European wheat.  They also believed 
corn to be the root cause of rural conservatism and under-consumption, as peasants growing 
maize for subsistence had little incentive to participate in the expanding market economy.
26
 
To nearly all the MAP scientists, however, any reform effort that did not acknowledge 
corn’s centrality to Mexican agriculture was spurious.  In the first few years of the program, the 
vast majority of funding went toward corn, reflecting the plant’s dominant role in Mexican life.  
As scholars Karin Matchett and Jonathan Harwood have demonstrated, the MAP corn breeders 
did not simply transplant American hybrids into Mexican soil, but experimented with open-
pollinated varieties that had been neglected by U.S. seed companies as they sought to 
commercialize seed distribution during the 1920s and 1930s.  Especially for MAP corn breeder 
Paul Manglesdorf, who had worked for years among poor farmers in East Texas, the gospel of 
hybrid corn made little sense to small-scale farmers, whether in the U.S. South or Mexico.
27
 
 In the decade after World War II’s end, however, the MAP’s early emphasis on corn 
breeding and appropriate technologies was gradually eroded from both within and without.  After 
slow progress in improving corn yields on rain fed ejido plots, the MAP organized a team to 
research wheat production in the Mexican northwest.  That project was led by Norman Borlaug, 
a former DuPont microbiologist, who would reap major yield increases with large commercial 
farmers in the states of Sonora and Sinaloa.  Eager to boast of national technical progress, and 
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desperately seeking food security in the nascent Cold War, the Mexican state celebrated the 
MAP’s northern work in wheat.  As urban, middle-class Mexicans began to eat wheat bread in 
ever-increasing quantities, the ruling party hailed Borlaug’s success as a core plank of the 
“Mexican Miracle”—the period of national growth between 1940 and the late 1960s.  
Underwriting this success, however, were the hundreds of millions of pesos that the state 
funneled into dams and irrigation projects for the coastal northwest, and in so doing, ensured the 
eclipse of the communally held, subsistence-oriented ejidos of the population-dense center by the 
northern model of private, commercial farms.  Water and state capital were the keys to Mexico’s 
Green Revolution, for without dams and irrigation ditches, the MAP’s improved wheats 
performed little better than local varieties.
28
 
 Agricultural science, therefore, collided with political economy in the Mexican case to 
produce a rural world whose shape and form was never inevitable, but the result of human 
choices.  Just as had been true in the early years of the twentieth century in the American South, 
science and “modernization” meant many things to many different people, and for us to assume 
that rural depopulation, consolidation, and the advent of agribusiness-style farming was an 
unavoidable endpoint, conceals a far more complex story of contingency and choice.  As I 
continue to trace the early years of the project that later became known as the Green Revolution, 
from Mexico back into the American South, I hope to gain a clearer understanding of how the 
agricultural assistance programs of the Cold War came to exclude those earlier, more democratic 
visions of rural change. 
 My three-week visit to the RAC in May was both useful and enlightening, because it 
allowed me a first glimpse into the institutional world wherein the major decisions were made 
that propelled the Rockefeller philanthropies outward from the American South.  However, in 
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that limited time period, I was only able to cover a portion of the material that I need to tell the 
longer story of the Green Revolution as it progressed in the 1950s and beyond.  Thankfully, I 
will be returning to the RAC this winter for a seven-week stay, on an International Dissertation 
Research Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council.  I very much look forward to 
my return. 
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